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Wyoming Law Review
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2010

NUMBER 2

THE GOOD GUY ACTUALLY DOES WIN
Justice Marilyn S. Kite*
There is a vague popular belief that lawyers are necessarily
dishonest. I say vague, because when we consider to what extent
confidence and honors are reposed in and conferred upon lawyers by
the people, it appears improbable that their impression of dishonesty
is very distinct and vivid. Yet the impression is common, almost
universal. Let no young man choosing the law for a calling for a
moment yield to the popular belief—resolve to be honest at all events;
and if in your own judgment you cannot be an honest lawyer, resolve
to be honest without being a lawyer. Choose some other occupation,
rather than one in the choosing of which you do, in advance, consent
to be a knave.1

How Compliance with Ethical Rules Pays
We all know the old saying “good guys finish last.” Well, my observation after
twenty-five years of practicing law and almost ten years of serving on the bench, is
that just the opposite is true in the context of the legal profession. I would like to
think that is so because the purpose of our adversarial system is justice for all. And
if that is our purpose, following ethical rules that require honesty, diligence, and
competence should result in achieving success, both for the client of the moment
and the attorney over the long term. Before you scoff or conclude I am hopelessly
naive, let me share with you some experiences that prove my point.
* Marilyn S. Kite was sworn into office on June 2, 2000. She received her B.A. from the
University of Wyoming in 1970 with Honors and her J.D. from the University of Wyoming College
of Law in 1974. Prior to her appointment to the Wyoming Supreme Court, Justice Kite served as
Senior Assistant Attorney General for the State of Wyoming from 1974 through 1978. She entered
private practice when she joined the law firm of Holland & Hart LLP in 1979, and she was a partner
in the firm’s Jackson office until her appointment to the Wyoming Supreme Court. In July 2010,
Justice Kite will become the first female Chief Justice of the Wyoming Supreme Court.
1
Abraham Lincoln, Notes for a Law Lecture (circa July 1850), in The Wit and Wisdom of
Abraham Lincoln as Reflected in His Briefer Letters 29, 32 (H. Jack Lang ed., Stackpole Books
2006) (1941).
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Although lawyers have a never-ending list of rules with which we must
comply, perhaps those most important to our ultimate success are contained in
the Rules of Professional Conduct.2 For the most part, those rules are intuitive
and grounded in principles of common sense. Compliance with the details of
the rules requires careful study by practicing lawyers. However, you can hardly
go wrong if you simply behave in the practice of law the same way your mother
told you to live your life—honestly, diligently and with concern for others. Every
day we see evidence that when lawyers do that, both the lawyers and the clients
benefit, and when they don’t, the reverse is equally true.

I. Honesty
Candor Toward the Tribunal—Rule 3.3
Not surprisingly, the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit attorneys from
making false statements to the court.3 We do not often see lawyers intentionally
providing to the court false factual statements related to the actual dispute at issue.
However, it deserves mention that the rule also prohibits false factual statements
about procedural matters, such as reasons for extension of deadlines, details of
communication with opposing counsel, and the status of discovery efforts.4
Lawyers all too often forget that prohibition includes false statements of law,
as well as fact. Specifically, a lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose “legal
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse
to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.” 5
Understandably, a lawyer may fear the prospect of including adverse legal
authority in pleadings filed on a client’s behalf. Experience both as a practicing
lawyer and a member of the judiciary has shown me that, not only is there nothing
to fear, but lawyers should look upon that adverse authority, especially if not cited
by the opponent, as an opportunity to hone their argument and encourage the
court toward their interpretation, as well as to gain the respect of the tribunal.
After all, isn’t it likely the court will discover the authority on its own, or even
worse, be subject to a reversal because the attorney failed to do his or her job of
fully educating the court on the legal issue at stake? One need only imagine how
the client’s fortunes might be affected in either case.

2

Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct (2009); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct (2009).

3

Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3.

See Wyo. Rules
3.3(a)(1).

of

Wyo. Rules
3.3(a)(2).

Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(2); Model Rules

4

5

of

Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(1); Model Rules
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A good example of the proper approach was provided by the Wyoming
Attorney General’s office in Smith v. State.6 The defendant in Smith argued that
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when the
prosecutor referenced the defendant’s refusal to submit to DNA testing during
the investigation of a cold case.7 The defendant argued the prosecution used
his refusal as tantamount to a statement of guilt. The state provided substantial
authority to refute the defendant’s argument that appeared to be determinative
of the issue. However, the attorneys for the state did not stop there. Instead, they
anticipated, even though the defendant did not raise the issue, that the court
might be concerned the comment on the defendant’s refusal violated a different
constitutional protection, that of the Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable search and seizure.8 As a consequence, the state provided the court
with authority concerning the Fourth Amendment issue and distinguished it
from the case in point.9 While it is possible that in the course of considering the
case, the court may not have discovered the Fourth Amendment issue, it is more
likely it would have done so. Had it not been for the state’s attorney confronting
the issue, the court would not have had the benefit of the state attorney’s artful
distinction of the authority from the defendant’s case. Without question, that
action by the state’s attorney not only furthered the client’s interest in having the
conviction affirmed, but increased the credibility of the attorneys involved, which
could only assist them in future cases before the court. This is a perfect example of
how following the ethical rules, or even arguably, going beyond what was required
by those rules, helped the attorneys succeed, for both the client and themselves.

II. Diligence
Balancing Rule 3.4—Fairness to Opponent and Rule 1.3—Diligence
Perhaps the most difficult balance lawyers must maintain is their obligation
to zealously represent their client, while at the same time complying with the
requirement that they treat their adversaries with fairness. Rule 1.3 is interesting
because it contains much more in the comments than it does in the one sentence
of the rule:
Rule 1.3. Diligence
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.10

6

199 P.3d 1052 (Wyo. 2009).

7

Id. at 1059.

8

Id. at 1061 n.1.

9

Id.

10

Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3.
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In the comments, we learn that while lawyers must act with “commitment,”
“dedication,” and “zeal,” they are not expected to “press every advantage that
might be realized for a client” and are expected to use professional discretion in
determining how to pursue achieving the client’s objective.11 Finding the right
balance between diligence and fairness is much easier in theory than in practice.
Lawyers often face the situation where they must choose between
accommodating their opposing counsel’s request for an extension of a deadline
and their client’s desire to “stick it to” the opposing party. While it may sound
trite, this is actually an area in which lawyers can further their client’s interest
by cooperating with their opponents’ reasonable requests for accommodation.
Human nature dictates that a person is more likely to cooperate with you if, in
fact, you have been cooperative with them. There will, without doubt, be times
when an individual lawyer is in desperate need of an extension on the client’s
behalf and if that lawyer has been reasonable in the past, opposing counsel will
likely feel the need to return the favor. On occasion, every lawyer has encountered
or will encounter a client who wants to fight every step of the way and to inflict as
much pain on the opponent as the rules will allow. That is when your persuasive
talents will be tested. You need to convince your client that it is in his or her
self-interest to be accommodating, within reason; if you are unsuccessful, you will
have to decide whether to exercise that “professional discretion” and do the right
thing in spite of your client’s immediate concern.
I am reminded, somewhat painfully, of an experience I had in my first year
of practice with an accommodation that I will never forget and that engrained in
me the instinct to return that favor to others. As an assistant attorney general, I
represented the Environmental Quality Council in its first appeal to the Wyoming
Supreme Court.12 I worked diligently on the appellee’s brief, having read the rules
carefully and calculated the filing deadline with precision.13 I finished the brief
and made all eight copies a day ahead of time. In an abundance of caution, I called
the clerk of the Supreme Court to let her know I was going to file a day early. To
my horror, she pleasantly informed me that the brief should have been filed five
days earlier! Don’t ask how I could have made that mistake; I just did in spite
of acting “diligently.” In a trembling voice, I asked if there was any possibility
of filing the brief late and she said there was if my opposing counsel did not
object. With sweaty hands, I placed a call to Don Jones, city attorney for the
Town of Torrington, and explained to him my predicament. Obviously, he could
have gained a tactical advantage if the case would have proceeded absent a brief
11

Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3 cmt. 1; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3

cmt. 1.
12

Town of Torrington v. Envtl. Quality Council, 557 P.2d 1143 (Wyo. 1976).

See generally Wyo. R. App. P. 7.06 (providing for filing deadlines); Wyo. Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 1.3 cmt. 3 (discussing timeliness as part of the duty of diligence); Model Rules of
Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3 cmt. 3 (2009) (discussing timeliness as part of the duty of diligence).
13
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from the appellee. Without hesitation, he calmly agreed to an extension and I
saw my career return from the dead. I have never, ever forgotten that exercise of
professional discretion. While my client ultimately prevailed, I have no doubt that
many, many clients of Don Jones benefited over the years from the desire of his
colleagues to treat him as they had been treated, despite how badly a particular
client may have wanted to stick it to the opponent.
As if this experience was not enough to convince me of the wisdom of the
Golden Rule in the practice of law, I had another opportunity to benefit from
the professionalism of Wyoming attorneys later in my career. For this story, I will
leave out the names of the parties involved to protect the guilty . . . that would be
my partner and me! In a hotly contested case before a state agency, our Fortune
500 client had refused to produce certain internal corporate information on the
grounds that the requested documents contained trade secrets. The information
was highly sensitive and had the potential to affect the client’s competitive position
in the industry. After appealing the matter all the way up the chain of command
to the board of directors, we received the explicit direction not to produce the
information. Unfortunately, we had prepared a draft response to the agency in
anticipation of the client ultimately agreeing to produce the data, and as a result
of an internal miscommunication in our office, the wrong response was filed and
the beans were spilled! When we discovered our monumental mistake, there was
nothing for us to do but throw ourselves on the mercy of opposing counsel. After
several very tense hours, we were informed that she and her client had agreed to
return the response unopened. Now, that was professionalism. I never had the
opportunity to return the favor, but I know that I would if I ever found myself
in that position. I would like to think that the relationship we had with opposing
counsel in that case affected her willingness to accommodate us. If so, the Golden
Rule certainly worked in our favor and ultimately, worked in our client’s favor, in
a very difficult situation.
This conundrum of balancing diligence with fairness becomes more difficult
if the attorney’s action may directly affect the outcome for the client. How far
does the duty of fairness to the opposition go? If attorneys see an opportunity
to obtain a default judgment or to defeat an opponent’s claim without acting
dishonestly, but simply by not volunteering information, should they do so?
The Wyoming Supreme Court has made it clear that an attorney has no duty
to the opposing party if he simply remains silent when a request for information
is received. In Halberstam v. Cokeley, counsel for the plaintiff received an inquiry
from defendant’s counsel about whether and when the out-of-state defendant was
served in a lawsuit over a real estate contract.14 When plaintiff ’s counsel did not

14

872 P.2d 109, 110 (Wyo. 1994).
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respond, defendant’s counsel assumed service had not occurred and, consequently,
failed to file a timely answer, which led to a default judgment.15 The court held:
Essentially, the Halberstams are arguing that Cohen owed
them a duty because Cohen did not tell them that he would
not inform them after he was asked to do so. An attorney is an
advocate whose duty is to zealously represent his client to the
best of his ability. An attorney’s duties are to his client not to the
adverse party. Moore was the Halberstams’ lawyer, not Cohen.
Cohen never stated that he would inform Moore when service
was made. We will not imply a duty upon an opposing attorney
simply based upon his silence to a request.16
Ask yourself whether the plaintiff ’s attorney was acting “fairly” when he
chose not to respond to the defendant’s attorney’s request. He had no obligation
to do so under any rule. Certainly, the defendant had the ability to obtain the
answer directly from his own client. In fact, would it not be reasonable to assume
that such communication with the client would occur? Consequently, it is not
surprising that the court determined a duty is not created merely by a request for
information to be voluntarily produced.17
An attorney faces a different proposition when one party fails to answer
an interrogatory or uses the discovery process in a fashion to avoid providing
information that may be required for the opposing party to protect its rights
in a timely fashion. A series of Wyoming cases in the area of governmental
claims have shown that providing a “zealous” defense may include withholding
jurisdictional objections to a claim against a governmental entity, resulting in
the claimant missing the statute of limitations, thus relieving the governmental
entity of liability.18 One may legitimately argue that it is not the responsibility
of the government’s counsel to inform the plaintiff ’s counsel that the claim is
defective in time to allow an amendment to cure the defect, and a jurisdictional
defect can be raised at any time. In fact, Rule 1.3 may be read to require an
attorney to raise such an objection in order to provide diligent representation.19
However, the question is quite different if the defendant refuses to answer an
explicit interrogatory about the basis for an allegation that the claim is defective,
15

Id.

16

Id. at 112 (citing Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d 295, 303 (Wyo. 1983)).

17

See id.

See Gose v. City of Douglas, 218 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2009); McCann v. City of Cody, 210 P.3d
1078 (Wyo. 2009); Lavatai v. State, 121 P.3d 121 (Wyo. 2005).
18

19
See Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2009) (“[A] lawyer should . . . take
whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.”); Model
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2009) (“[A] lawyer should . . . take whatever lawful and
ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.”).
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thus requiring the plaintiff to file motions to compel or take other action to
force an answer, and, in the meantime, the statute of limitations for filing a valid
claim expires.

Rule 3.1—Meritorious Claims and Contentions and Rule 3.2—
Expediting Litigation
Attorneys are often faced with clients who are emotionally invested in their
case, are not capable of making rational legal judgments, and want their attorneys
to “slash and burn” the opposition. In those situations, the attorney’s skill as
counselor, as opposed to advocate, is tested. Tension can exist between a client’s
desired litigation strategy and the admonition of the rules of conduct, such as Rule
3.1, Meritorious Claims and Contentions, and Rule 3.2, Expediting Litigation:
Rule 3.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions
(a) A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and
fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law.
(b) A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the
respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration,
may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that
every element of the case be established.
(c) The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other court
document; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation.20
Rule 3.2. Expediting Litigation
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client.21

20

Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.1; see also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.1.

21

Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.2; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.2.
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Lawyers must work to convince their clients that, in the long run, working
professionally within the rules will inure to their benefit, but that can be extremely
difficult in the face of opponents who are not so restrained. Attorneys must find
for themselves that point at which they are personally comfortable both complying
with the letter and the spirit of the rules and, at the same time, fully and faithfully
furthering their client’s interests.
Most judges are loath to intervene in the seemingly endless disputes between
parties regarding discovery and pretrial procedures. However, when clear violations
of the rules occur, courts can, sometimes reluctantly, utilize their authority to
impose sanctions. A review of Wyoming cases discloses the type of behavior that
can cause a court to require that the offending party bear at least some of the
cost incurred by the other party as a result of a disregard of the Rules of Professional Conduct.22
For example, Rule 10.5 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure allows
the court to require a party who files a frivolous appeal to pay costs and attorneys’
fees incurred by the opposing party.23 Normally, no sanctions are imposed in
appeals of discretionary rulings because there are usually legitimately competing
arguments entitled to consideration by the court. However, when it appears to the
appellate court that one side is unduly unreasonable and essentially is abusing the
legal process, sanctions may be imposed.24
Many of the cases where sanctions have been imposed involve domestic
relations and child custody cases in which emotions, rather than a bona fide
legal issue, can be the driving force behind the litigation. In G.G.V. v. J.L.R., the
Wyoming Supreme Court was obviously convinced that the mother’s behavior
purposefully frustrated and delayed the process, stating:
In this instance, we find that there was no reasonable cause for
Mother’s appeal. The district court’s ruling was discretionary.
However, even the incomplete record, brought to this Court by
Mother, supports a conclusion that it would have been an abuse
of discretion for the district court to have done anything other
than that which it did, and that Mother’s pursuit of this appeal

22
Montoya v. Montoya, 125 P.3d 265 (Wyo. 2005) (imposing sanctions for failure to provide
a record preventing meaningful appellate review and failure to present a legal justification for
appeal); G.G.V. v. J.L.R., 39 P.3d 1066 (Wyo. 2002) (imposing sanctions for purposeful frustration
of proceedings); Meyer v. Rodenbaugh, 982 P.2d 1242 (Wyo. 1999) (imposing sanctions for appeal
brought in abuse of the legal process); Phifer v. Phifer, 845 P.2d 384 (Wyo. 1993) (imposing
sanctions for appeal without factual or legal justification); Manners v. Manners, 706 P.2d 671 (Wyo.
1985) (imposing sanctions for appeal without factual or legal justification).
23

Wyo. R. App. P. 10.5.

24

Meyer, 982 P.2d at 1245–46.
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was yet another example of her efforts to unnecessarily prolong
the proceedings, as well as increase the cost of the proceedings.
Further, the record supports a conclusion that Mother acted
knowingly and with a fairly complete understanding of the
delays and disruptions she could cause to the stability of Child’s
life, to Father, and to the courts.25
Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court imposed sanctions in Phifer v. Phifer
and Manners v. Manners, when one parent frivolously appealed in order to,
without factual or legal justification, avoid or reduce child support payments.26
Sanctions may also be appropriate when the appellant fails to provide a record
in a divorce case, which prevents a meaningful review; to allow meaningful
review on appeal; and fails to support his or her cause with cogent argument and
legal authority.27
Attorneys should beware of making unfounded legal claims in an effort to
provide “zealous” representation. Rule 3.1(a) makes it clear that lawyers must
not “assert an issue unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is
not frivolous.”28 Even if a frivolous argument is ultimately withdrawn, if that
withdrawal is so late in the proceeding that opposing parties have unnecessarily
incurred costs in countering the frivolous argument, sanctions may be warranted.29
Irrespective of whether sanctions are warranted, unsubstantiated legal or factual
arguments do nothing to further the client’s interests or the attorney’s reputation
for credibility.

Rule 3.8—Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
Rule 3.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct calls particular attention to
the unique role prosecuting attorneys have in our judicial system and admonishes
them to exercise restraint in prosecuting charges, respect the defendant’s right to
counsel, disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense, and refrain from making
public comments on pending cases.30 In addition to compliance with those
specific requirements, prosecutors must guard against overzealous representation
of the state or risk a different kind of sanction: reversal of the conviction they
so fervently sought. Reversal of a conviction will only occur when the court

25
39 P.3d at 1076 (citing Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 1996); Barnes v.
Barnes, 998 P.2d 942, 946 (Wyo. 2000); Basolo v. Gose, 994 P.2d 968 (Wyo. 2000)).
26

Phifer, 845 P.2d 384; Manners, 706 P.2d 671.

27

Montoya, 125 P.3d at 268–69.

28

Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.1(a) (2009).

29

Budd-Falen Law Offices, P.C. v. Rocky Mt. Recovery, Inc., 114 P.3d 1284, 1291 (Wyo.

2005).
30

Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8 (2009).
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determines that without the prosecutorial misconduct, the jury may have reached
a different verdict and reversal is necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice.31 That
standard was met in Strange v. State, where the “prosecutor repeatedly committed
misconduct by seeking a conviction based upon community protection from the
drug problem, rather than a conviction based upon the evidence”;32 in Seymore v.
State, where the prosecutor told the jury “that [he] believed the appellant was
guilty, that the appellant had a duty to bring in any exculpatory evidence, and
that the jury had a duty to convict the appellant”;33 and in Earll v. State, where
“[n]ot only did the prosecutor misrepresent to the jury, as sworn testimony
before the court, the testimony of the accused’s trusted girlfriend in an effort to
impeach the accused’s testimony, but the prosecutor also declared to the jury the
prosecutor’s personal knowledge of that trusted girlfriend’s sworn testimony.”34 In
Capshaw v. State, detailed reference by the prosecutor to uncharged misconduct,
the admissibility of which the court had not yet ruled, constituted “prosecutorial
brinkmanship which is contrary to the ordered process envisioned in Vigil
[v. State] and is inconsistent with the prosecutor’s ethical obligation to further
the ends of justice.”35 However, the reference did not result in reversal.36 Reversal
of a criminal conviction is not a punishment of the prosecutor, but an effort to
ensure the accused a fair trial. However, it is certainly a result that is not desired by
the prosecutor.
Because prosecutors play a unique role in the criminal justice system, the rules
impose even greater ethical obligations on them.37 While Rule 3.6 prohibits all
lawyers from making extrajudicial statements that may become public concerning
a pending matter, Rule 3.8 imposes an additional and specific requirement
on prosecutors to “refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a
substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused.” 38 In
Board of Professional Responsibility v. Murray, a prosecutor was publicly censured

31

Moe v. State, 110 P.3d 1206, 1212 (Wyo. 2005).

32

195 P.3d 1041, 1048 (Wyo. 2008).

33

152 P.3d 401, 411 (Wyo. 2007).

34

29 P.3d 787, 791 (Wyo. 2001).

11 P.3d 905, 909 (Wyo. 2000); accord Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 357 (Wyo. 1996) (setting
forth the test for the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts under Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b)).
35

36

Capshaw, 11 P.3d at 914.

Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2009) (discussing the general role of
prosecutors and particularly stating, “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice
and not simply that of an advocate”); see also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8 (2009).
37

Compare Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(e), and Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
R. 3.8(f ), with Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.6, and Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
R. 3.6.
38
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for making derogatory statements about a defendant and a discharged juror
after a mistrial.39 That particular infraction also resulted in the exclusion of the
prosecutor from the retrial of the case and a change of venue.40
Even without an issue being raised by opposing counsel, the courts also have
an independent duty to report observed violations of the ethical rules by any
attorney, including prosecutors. In Haynes v. State, the court stated:
Should we continue to see cases in which a prosecutor
improperly informs the jury of the consequences of a verdict
of not guilty by reason of mental illness, we will consider
referral of the matter to the Board of Professional Responsibility
as is our responsibility under Cannon 3(D) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and we remind district judges of their same
responsibility.41
A review of the facts in most of the cases where prosecutorial misconduct is
found to have occurred demonstrates that the offending actions of the prosecutor
were not necessary in order to obtain a conviction. Those improper actions appear
quite clearly to be the result of overzealous attorneys, perhaps in the heat of the
battle, losing sight of their ethical obligations in their effort to win at any cost. In
the end, that kind of behavior damages the client’s cause, as well as the judicial
system itself. In a concurring opinion in Hatch v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
Judge O’Brien commented upon that phenomenon:
In spite of considerable rhetoric to the contrary, trials,
particularly jury trials, are imperfect engines of justice. For
routine cases the trial process works reasonably well; it yields
rough justice within such practical and financial constraints as
we are willing to abide. However, experience teaches that as cases
approach the margins the trial machinery frequently sputters
and oftentimes fails. Marginal cases include those with highly
technical, complex or convoluted facts. A trial is not a didactic
paradigm and, given the limits of time, resources and procedure,
extremely intricate matters are sometimes beyond the ken of a
judge or jury. Other cases are on the margin because they involve
celebrity participants, severe consequences, extreme or peculiar
circumstances, inordinate media attention or highly emotional
issues. As to the latter the magnifying glass of close scrutiny and
39

143 P.3d 353, 358–59 (Wyo. 2006).

40

Id. at 356.

186 P.3d 1204, 1212 n.2 (Wyo. 2008) (citing United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 265
(3d Cir. 1984); Suarez v. State, 481 So.2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1985); AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman,
923 P.2d 395, 402 (Haw. 1996); Gonzalez v. State, 768 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)).
41
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the attendant hype are simply inevitable consequences of a free
society with open institutions. Without radical change in our
approach to the trial process we have no choice but to accept
imperfections, inconsistencies, and even occasional injustice.
But an ominous problem emerges, one that is not the necessary
product of confounding facts or unveiled process.
A trial should be a rational exercise, not an emotional
experience. When counsel intentionally drives an otherwise
routine case to the margins by infecting the trial with personal
issues or by purposefully seeking to supercharge emotions, alert
observers quickly recognize that the object is not justice, but
victory. The ethical obligation to zealously serve client interests
is tempered by the opposing, but no less imposing, obligation to
act within the limits of the law—not merely the letter, but also
the spirit, of the law. Any failure to appropriately and consistently
measure duty to clients against duty to the profession perpetuates
the “hired gun” image some lawyers cultivate and we all must
live with. Worse, it sustains a popularly held misconception that
our professional ethic accepts the notions that success justifies,
and occasionally necessitates, excessive zeal and that the cost
of victory is irrelevant. Finally, such conduct reinforces the
stereotype of the avaricious plaintiff spurred to trial by even more
venal attorneys. When a case is measured, not by the merit of the
cause, the quality of the evidence, or the logic of the arguments,
but by the level of invective, something is amiss. A trial then
becomes an ordeal which is neither dignified nor appropriate
and, predictably, the result reflects the performance; the process
is demeaned, as are the participants.42
Finding the proper balance between diligent, zealous representation of
the client and fairness to the opponent is often very difficult and demands a
thorough understanding of the applicable procedural and substantive law and an
examination of one’s own conscience. Often, the right path is not found explicitly
in the Rules of Professional Conduct. As noted by author Joseph G. Allegretti,
“the best check upon the excesses of litigation is not the rules of the profession or
even judicial oversight, but the values and character of individual lawyers.”43 It is
safe to say that attorneys who strive to comply with both will benefit themselves
as well as their clients in the long run.

42

930 P.2d 382, 398 (Wyo. 1997) (O’Brien, J., concurring).

Joseph G. Allegetti, The Lawyer’s Calling: Christian Faith
(Paulist Press 1996).
43
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III. Integrity of the Judicial Process
Rule 8.2(a) and Rule 8.4(d)
Lawyers have a unique responsibility to respect and enhance the judicial
process. The Preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct states, “A lawyer,
as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of
the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality
of justice.”44 In addition to fulfilling their duties to their clients, lawyers should
“demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including
judges, other lawyers and public officials.”45 Often, in order to do their job,
lawyers must challenge official action, argue that individual judges have erred,
and seek to right the wrong their clients may have endured at the hands of the
government. However, that does not mean that lawyers can or should launch
personal attacks against individual judges, insult opposing counsel, or denigrate
the judicial process. This is another area in which common sense will tell you that
good guys do finish first. Is it surprising when lawyers who show judges respect
are, in turn, treated with respect? This does not mean lawyers should be expected
to be sycophants, simply that they show respect to the individual who is currently
holding the office of a judge and to the judicial process that is provided by
our constitutions.
All too often, we see pleadings filed in which insults are hurled at opposing
parties or derogatory statements are made about the competence or integrity of
judicial officers. Those pleadings do nothing to advance the interests of the client
and most certainly undermine the persuasiveness of the author. Recently, the
Wyoming Supreme Court, on its own motion, demonstrated that fact by striking
an offensive brief. The court stated:
In their brief, the Appellants repeatedly criticize, with
disrespectful language, the district court judge who entered the
“Order Granting Defendant’s Converted Motion for Summary
Judgment.” Appellants also criticize, with disrespectful language,
the district court judge who formerly presided in this matter.
In addition, Appellants criticize this Court, although those
criticisms pale in comparison to the repeated criticisms of said
district court judges. Leaving no stone unturned, Appellants
also use their brief as a forum to cast aspersions at the Federal
District Court judge who presided over Appellants’ federal case.

44
Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct Preamble § 1 (2009); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
Preamble § 1 (2009).
45
Wyo. Rules
Preamble § 5.

of

Prof’l Conduct Preamble § 5; Model Rules
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In addition, Appellants include innuendo about the potential
for bribing judges. Last but not least, the Appellants criticize the
members of a particular religion.
While this Court, like any court, must not be oversensitive to criticism, Appellants’ repeated use of disrespectful
language goes beyond the bounds of what this Court can be
expected to tolerate. This Court concludes that Appellants’
brief must be stricken from this Court’s file. This Court further
concludes that the district court’s “Order Granting Defendant’s
Converted Motion for Summary Judgment” should be summarily affirmed.46
The court noted that it had followed the practice of striking offensive
pleadings for over one hundred years, and that practice is also followed by the
majority of state and federal courts.47 Although we are not often faced with a case
where it is necessary to strike a pleading to sanction offensive conduct, sadly, we
see with some frequency a lesser level of acrimony that most certainly detracts
from attorneys’ efforts to further their clients’ interests.
Rule 8.2(a) prohibits lawyers from making statements “that the lawyer
knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning
the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal
officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.”48
This rule was applied in Board of Professional Responsibility, Wyoming State Bar v.
Davidson.49 The Board found that the attorney had made allegations in a motion
that a judge had engaged in ex parte communication with opposing counsel with
reckless disregard of the truth of that allegation.50 The court held that recklessness
in this context is judged by an objective standard: in other words, whether a
reasonable attorney would have made the statements, not whether this particular
attorney knew these statements to be false.51 The clear and convincing evidence
before the Board established that the statement was untrue and the attorney
made no investigation into whether the ex parte communication had actually
occurred.52 The Court also noted that Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) and Rule of

46

Gose v. City of Douglas, 218 P.3d 945, 947 (Wyo. 2009).

Id. at 946 (citing In re Stone, 305 P.2d 777, 786 (Wyo. 1957); Eggart v. Dunning, 89 P.
1022, 1024 (Wyo. 1907)).
47

48

Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.2(a); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.2(a).

49

205 P.3d 1008 (Wyo. 2009).

50

Id. at 1011.

51

Id. at 1014.

52

Id. at 1010–11.
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Professional Conduct Rule 3.1(c) require that any pleading signed by an attorney
is certification of factual support for the allegations contained therein, “formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.”53
Two older Wyoming Supreme Court cases contain interesting discussions
regarding the balance between the right to free speech under the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution and an attorney’s obligation to refrain from
insulting the judiciary and, thereby, undermining the court system in the eye
of the public. In State Board of Law Examiners v. Spriggs, the court suspended
an attorney because he “circulated a pamphlet attacking this court, and making
false, contemptuous and scandalous charges against the court.54 The pamphlet
was issued by the respondent when he was a candidate for nomination to the
office of Justice of this court, and one of the members of the Supreme Court was
his opponent.”55 The court commented:
From a reading of the paragraphs quoted, one can only
arrive at the opinion and conclusion that the respondent was
conducting a deliberate campaign of smearing, condemning and
belittling the court before the citizens of the state, the Governor,
legislature and law school, and soliciting invitations to speak
at bar associations and other groups, for the sole purpose of
criticizing and discrediting the court, and all of this, because the
court had decided a case against his client and denied a rehearing.
Even if the court had erred in its decision, as contended by the
respondent, that would not have justified the respondent in
going to the extremes he did in this article.
We have learned years ago that a losing litigant almost
always believes the court is wrong, and his attorney often has the
same opinion. That is natural and to be expected, but this is the
first time an attorney has published such a violent attack upon
the integrity of this court. If every attorney who is dissatisfied
with the decisions of the Supreme Court would go before the
public with statements as are above quoted, it would not be long
before the courts of this state would be in disrepute and the
citizens believe they could not receive a fair, honest and impartial
decision in this court.
....

Id. at 1010 n.3 (citing Wyo. R. Civ. P. 11(b)); id. at 1014 n.6 (citing Wyo. Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 3.1(c)).
53

54

155 P.2d 285, 286 (Wyo. 1945).

55

Id.
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The Utah Supreme Court in 1912 had this to say on the
subject: “And, as has been repeatedly held, liberty and freedom
of speech under the Constitution do not mean the unrestrained
right to do and say what one pleases at all times and under all
circumstances, and do not license scandal and defamation of
courts; that it is the use and not the abuse of free speech that
is protected, and that everyone at all times is responsible for an
abuse of the privilege; and that an attorney, guilty of such abuse
by slandering or scandalizing or defaming a court or judge, is
subject to discipline and disbarment.”56
Later, in Application of Stone, the Wyoming Supreme Court charged an
attorney with contempt––and found him guilty––for filing documents related to
his application for admission to practice that contained attacks on the court and
held he was not protected by the constitutionally guaranteed rights to freedom of
speech and press.57 Justice Blume, in a characteristically artful concurring opinion,
noted that while courts must be restrained in their findings of contempt, where
attacks are so egregious and pervasive, courts must act to preserve their integrity.58
He recognized attorneys who receive unfavorable rulings may be heard to object,
but added:
There is, perhaps, some common sense in the old adage which
we have in the West that a defeated litigant has 24 hours (some
say 48) to “cuss” the court, but that he must “shut up” thereafter.
It is a crude compromise between freedom of speech and, if
we want to keep on being civilized, the respect necessarily due
the court.59
Lawyers must be aware of the impact their comments on judges and the judicial
process can have on their clients or other laymen. The public rightly presumes
that lawyers are more knowledgeable about the performance of judges and the
effectiveness of our judicial system than those on the outside and, consequently,
comments by lawyers regarding judicial officers or the judicial process can have a
significant impact on the public’s perceptions about our judicial system. It is all
too easy to blame unsatisfactory results achieved by an attorney on alleged frailties
of the judge or the judicial process, rather than the weaknesses in the case itself.
Such disrespectful commentary then is often repeated by others as objective truth.

56
Id. at 290–91 (quoting In re Hilton, 158 P. 691, 696 (Utah 1912) (internal citations
omitted)).
57

305 P.2d 777, 789 (Wyo. 1957).

58

Id. at 790–91 (Blume, J., concurring).

59

Id. at 792.
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It is not difficult in any of these cases to conclude that the approach taken by the
offending attorneys did not further their interests or the interests of their clients
on the merits of their cases.
In contrast, many effective attorneys challenge judicial decisions directly,
provide authority to support their claim of error, and urge reversal without ever
maligning the competence or integrity of other judicial officers or the system as a
whole. Judges are expected to examine and question precedent and to be willing
to correct errors made. They will more likely be persuaded by rational arguments,
by evidence in the record, and by legal authority than by personal attacks on
opposing counsel or the judge.

Conclusion
Lawyers should be encouraged to constantly examine their actions in light
of their ethical obligations to the public and to the profession. I do not suggest
that the right course of action will always be obvious. The inherent tension
between zealous representation and fairness to the opponent can make the “right”
decision unclear. However, nothing in the rules should be viewed an excuse for
deceitful or duplicitous actions. Lawyers known for their ethical and honest
behavior are more likely to succeed for the client of the moment, as well as in their
professional careers.
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